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nDynamics in charity donation decisions: Insights from a
large longitudinal data set
Marijke C. Leliveld*† and Hans Risselada*
Despite the vast body of research on charitable giving and its drivers, no research has investigated the longitudinal
dynamics of individual donationdecisions.Weanalyzeduniquedatawith nearly 300,000 real donation decisionsmade
by more than 20,000 individuals for a period of 10 months. Each decision entailed a choice of what to do with money
received for completing a survey (on average,€0.67 per survey): keep it or donate to charity.We found thatmost of the
participants (89%) always chose to keep themoney. Within the group of people who sometimes kept and sometimes
donated the money (that is, Switchers), we find that people do not change their decision very often (cf. moral
consistency). However, the likelihood of donating increases when people kept the money the previous time, and
the amount at stake differs substantially (both positively and negatively). Finally, once Switchers donated, they are
more likely to keep themoney next time if they can earn more (for example, €2 now versus €0.50 last time), signaling
moral compensation. These longitudinal data provide a first step to better understand charity donation decisions, not









Charities benefit societies by taking on its most serious challenges. To
do so, they are dependent on people’s willingness to donate. In 2015, a
total of $373.35 billion was donated by Americans [2.1% of gross do-
mestic product (GDP)] (1). Although this number is lower in Europe
($22.4 billion; 0.2% of GDP) (2), it highlights the importance of
understanding charitable donation decisions and the drivers of these
decisions. Although many people donate more than one time in their
life, and previous donation decisions most likely influence subsequent
decisions, so far, research has mainly studied single observations of do-
nations. In the past, a large variety of researchers—political scientists,
sociologists, economists, and social psychologists—by using a variety
of methodologies have created a vast body of knowledge on which
factors influence a single (or aggregated) decision of whether and
how much to donate (3–7). Up to now, hardly any research is carried
out on the longitudinal aspects of charity donation decisions. To put it
differently, we do not know the influence of previous decisions on sub-
sequent decisions. This study will address this void.
To be able to answer this research question, we obtained a large lon-
gitudinal data set in which more than 20,000 individuals made nearly
300,000 donation decisions in a 10-month period. Specifically, the data
set is from a Dutch panel research organization. Participants of this
panel complete surveys and receive money for each completed survey.
Specifically, they receive €0.10 per question. After each survey, they
are asked whether they want to have this money paid to their own
account (listed first) or whether they want to donate it to 1 of 20 char-
ities, including, for example, United Nations Children’s Fund, STOP
AIDS NOW!, and theWorldWildlife Fund.With an average of 13.80
decisions per panel member, we have multiple observations per panel
member to study people’s donation decisions.
The decisions people made were real and not measures of hypothet-
ical donation or self-report. Large-scale charity research often uses these
self-report measures, for instance, the Household Giving Surveys by the
Gallup Organization (8) or the Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study
(9, 10). An important limitation of these surveys is the social desirabilitybias (11): People’s answers can be biased toward what they think is the
correct way of answering (12). People generally overreport the dona-
tions in self-report surveys, exceeding actual donations by 30.5% (13).
Our data set provides us with real decisions, therefore increasing the
external validity of the results.
Moreover, a crucial aspect of studying how previous decisions influ-
ence subsequent decisions is to have data not only on the instances
when people decided “Yes, I donate” but also on the instances when
they decided “I keep the money myself.” As trivial as this may sound,
most charities do not have any individual-level data on small donations,
such as door-to-door campaigns, because address information is often
missing (13). As a consequence, when analyzing the administrations of
charities, only the people’s recorded yearly overall donations to a charity
(or to charities in general) are used as the main dependent variable, ag-
gregating all separate instances when they were asked to donate. Note
that in other experimental (field) studies on charity donations, these in-
dividual data on donation decisions (yes and no decisions) are available
as well. However, within this type of research donation, decisions are
often onlymeasured once (14–16), or it concerns experimental research
on other types of prosocial decisions, such as repeated dictator games
(17, 18). Moreover, research on direct mailing effects within a charity
context (19–21) studied the effects of the frequency of directmailings on
donation decisions over time. Despite the rich insights of that research,
the emails contained different ways to persuade people to donate (that
is, the content of the emails varied). Because our data set contains the
information about each time a personwas asked the very same question
to donate over a longer period of time, we were able to study these dy-
namics of donation decisions in a more controlled setting.
The decision to donate to charity or to keep themoney to yourself is
essentially a choice between furthering your own self-interest and acting
prosocially. The field of behavioral ethics has extensively studied proso-
cial behavior, and we will build on these insights to speculate about pre-
dictions regarding behavior of those who did not consistently decided to
keep or to donate (that is, the so-called Switchers). Within this domain
of research, there are three processes known that take into account past
and future (un)ethical behavior to predict subsequent behavior: moral
consistency, moral habits, and moral licensing (22–24).
According to research onmoral consistency, past behavior can serve
as a signal to the self of how moral one is (22–28). Thus, when people1 of 7










 decided to help out at a fundraising in the past, they will infer from that
behavior that they value voluntarism.This subsequently leads to, for exam-
ple, the decision to help out during an event of your child’s school. In par-
ticular, past behavior can be seen as a signal of someone’s identity:What I
do defines who I am.Moral consistencywould therefore imply that people
are not very likely to switch a lot betweenbehaviors and thuswould predict
relative static patterns of decisions: People will always donate (that is, the
so-called Donators) or always keep the money (that is, so-called Keepers).
Like moral consistency, moral habits would also imply that people
are not very likely to switch a lot between behaviors. Habits formation is
used when we make the same decision multiple times, and habits often
reflect our personal values toward that behavior (22, 29, 30). Personality
traits, such as social value orientation (SVO) (31) and greed (32), which
have been shown to influence prosocial behavior, might thus be impor-
tant drivers of habitual donation decisions.
Both the moral habits literature and the moral consistency litera-
ture suggest the relative stability of people’s ethical behavior, including
charitable behavior. However, other research has shown that people
also balance their (un)ethical behavior: Once they behave ethically,
they subsequently behave more unethically, and vice versa. This pro-
cess is known as moral licensing and basically implies that people bal-
ance between their ethical and unethical acts (22, 33–35). Sometimes
they will keep the money, and sometimes they will donate. If moral
licensing takes place, we would thus expect to see people switch be-
tween donating and keeping (that is, the so-called Switchers).
Moral licensing also implies that what people decided to do in the
past determines which behavior is needed to balance it out again. Note
that panel members in our data set can remember two aspects of their
previous decision. First, they can remember their behavior in broad as-
pects: Did I donate—yes or no? Second, they can also remember the
specifics: How much money was at stake last time? This distinction is
particularly important because people always try to keep up a positive
moral self-image (MSI) (36) and remember past behavior in such a way
to maintain this positive MSI (37). For example, suppose you chose to
donate €0.50 last time, and now you have to make a decision to donate
or keep €2. You could base your current decision on the fact that you
decided to donate last time to license yourself to keep the money this
time, and by doing so, you would disregard the fact that you only do-
nated €0.50 to charity last time and now will be keeping €2 for yourself.
By taking into account exactly howmuch was at stake the previous and
current time, we can test whether people base their current decision on
the previous choice and amount at stake. That is, within the group of
Switchers, we tested the dynamics of donation decision based on previ-
ous choice and on howmuch is at stake now compared to the last time.
We acknowledge that this test is based on the assumption that peo-
ple can actually recall their past behavior and the amount at stake. To
check this assumption, wemeasured people’s recall ability (n= 916) (see
the Supplementary Materials). We found that 99.3% of the participants
correctly remembered whether (yes or no) they donated or kept the
money, and 32.9% of the participants correctly remembered the exact
amount at stake. In total, 78.2% reported an amount at stake within the
range that we define as “similar amount” in the analyses (see Materials
andMethods). All in all, we have sufficient reason to believe that people
are able to remember their past decisions.RESULTS
We will first present the results of the type of decision-makers on an
aggregate level and then zoom in on the dynamics within Switchers.Leliveld and Risselada, Sci. Adv. 2017;3 : e1700077 20 September 2017To study how stable (that is, Keepers or Donators) or dynamic (that
is, Switchers) people’s donation decisions were, we first analyzed the
frequency of these different types of decision-makers. First, we find that
the vast majority of individuals (89.3%) decided to always keep the
money (see Table 1). Only 6.4% always donated, and 4.4% of the people
were Switchers. Both moral consistency and habitual decision-making
predicted these stable decisions. As argued before, personality traits,
such as SVO (31) and greed (32), have been shown to be predictors of
habitual behaviors. To gain more insights into the process of decision-
making, we tested whether SVO and greed could predict the type of
decision-maker.
SVO is generally known as an indicator of the relative importance
of the self and the other in interpersonal settings (38–41). Specifically,
SVO differentiates three types of orientations: cooperators (who try to
maximize the joined outcome), individualists (who try to maximize
their own outcome), and competitors (who try to maximize the
difference between themselves and the other). Commonly, individu-
alists and competitors are referred to as proselfs and cooperators as
prosocials (40). Prosocials are reported to have donated more to char-
ities than proselfs (31).
To see whether SVO could predict the type of decision-maker in
our data set, we randomly selected 1048 participants from the originalTable 1. Descriptives of full sample and the three decision types.Full




(15.50)GenderMale 36% 37% 36% 28%Female 64% 63% 64% 72%Political orientationConservative 32% 32% 30% 28%Liberal 38% 38% 45% 43%Missing 5% 4% 5% 8%Did not vote/Not allowed to
vote/Don’t want to say25% 26% 20% 22%Income*Less than standard 18% 19% 16% 15%Standard 6% 6% 4% 3%1 to 2× standard 24% 25% 21% 21%More than 2× standard 20% 19% 26% 23%Don’t know 10% 10% 11% 13%Don’t want to say 19% 19% 19% 18%Missing 3% 3% 4% 7%n 20,457 18,257
(89.3%)891
(4.4%)1309
(6.4%)*Because of rounding, the percentages within the Keepers were summed
up to 101%.2 of 7










 pool of panelmembers and had them complete the SVOmeasure (40).
The classifications of SVO types in this sample match previous de-
scriptions of the general population (see table S3), indicating that
the participants in our study are not a biased representation of the
population. However, SVO could not predict the type of decision-
maker. That is, Keepers, Donators, and Switchers could not be de-
scribed in terms of different SVO types.
Second, we studied the role of dispositional greed, which is the ten-
dency to always want more and to never be satisfied (32, 42). Disposi-
tional greed has been found to predict greedy behavioral intentions and
behavior in a Dictator game (32). Therefore, we expected that Keepers
would be more greedy than Donators. We asked another randomly
selected group of 1027 participants to complete the seven-item greed
scale (for example, “One can never have enough money” and “I can’t
imagine having toomuch things”; Cronbach’s a = 0.88). However, Do-
nators (M= 2.95), Switchers (M= 2.91), andKeepers (M= 2.89) did not
significantly differ on greed (see Materials and Methods for the statis-
tical analyses). All in all, personality traits, such as SVOand greed, could
not predict whether people are Keepers, Switchers, or Donators. Thus,
they can also not account for the high percentage of stable preferences.
Because personality traits could not predict decision type, we studied
the role of more general demographic variables: gender, age, political
preference, and income. Previous research showed that Donators are
often younger, female, less conservative, and have a lower income than
nondonators (4–6, 43–45), and we tested whether these findings would
be replicated here. The second column inTable 1 shows overall descrip-
tives of the full sample, whereas the three rightmost columns show the
descriptives of the three specific donation types. Multinomial logit
models (see tables S1 and S2) with donation type as the dependent var-
iable and Switchers as the reference group show that liberals (as com-
pared to conservatives) and people who earn more than two times a
modal income (as compared to less than standard) are less likely to
be Keepers than Switchers. In addition, females are more likely to be
Donators than Switchers. Multinomial logit models with Keepers as the
reference category show that older people, people who earn a modal in-
come (as compared to less thanstandard), are less likely tobeDonators than
Keepers. In addition, females, liberals (as compared to conservatives), and
those who earn more than two times a modal income (as compared to
less than standard) are more likely to be Donators than Keepers. Com-
bined, these results suggest that Switchers seem to be a different group of
people compared to Keepers andDonators, although they do share com-
mon demographics.
Dynamics of donation decisions
To study the dynamics of longitudinal donation decisionswithin the group
of Switchers,we lookedathowthe choice at t−1 (donate versusnotdonate)
and the money involved at t − 1 and t (using the number of questions as a
direct measure of the amount of money at stake for potential donation or
income) influenced people’s decisions, controlling for age, gender, and po-
litical orientation. Parameters and interpretation of panel data probitmodel
analysis are presented in Table 2. We found that (i) those who donated at
the first observationaremore likely todonate at any time (t=0) and that (ii)
thosewho donated at the previous occasion aremore likely to donate at the
current occasion. These results are in line with moral consistency.
We split the discussion of the results between cases in which a panel
member did not donate at the previous occasion (at t − 1) and cases in
which a panel member did donate at the previous occasion (at t − 1) to
present the interactions. For thosewho did not donate at t− 1, we found
the following effects: When the number of questions was substantiallyLeliveld and Risselada, Sci. Adv. 2017;3 : e1700077 20 September 2017lower now than the last time (for example, €0.50 now versus €2 last
time), people weremore likely to donate compared towhen the number
of questions was more or less equal (for example, €0.50 now and €0.70
last time). In addition, when the number of questions was substantially
larger now than the last time (for example, €2 now versus €0.50 last
time), people weremore likely to donate compared towhen the number
of questions was more or less equal (for example, €2 now and €1.80 last
time). In short, changes in the number of questions (either positive or
negative changes) make previous nondonators more likely to donate.
These effects were different when participants decided to donate at
t − 1. The positive effect of having substantially fewer questions than
the last time is not significant. The positive effect of having substan-
tially more questions becomes negative. That is, when the number of
questions was substantially larger now than the last time (for example,
€2 now versus €0.50 last time), people who donated last time were less
likely to donate compared to when the number of questions was more
or less equal (for example, €2 now and €1.80 last time). To put it dif-
ferently, changes in the number of questions at best make previous
Donators not more likely to donate now but even less likely to donate
now if the number of questions is larger. This suggestsmoral licensing.DISCUSSION
The current work investigated the dynamics in charitable decision-
making using longitudinal data of real donation decisions. Results
showed that many people make very stable decisions, which could be
a sign of habit or moral consistency. However, we did not find that per-
sonality traits—often related to habitual behavior—are able to predict
decision types. Moreover, when people kept the money previously, and
the amount at stake differs substantially (both positively and negatively)
from the last time, the likelihood of donating increases. However, once
people have donated previously, they decide to keep the money more
often the next time when they can earnmore (for example, €2 now ver-
sus €0.50 last time), signalingmoral licensing. Our findings corroborate
survey research on self-reported momentary experiences of morality in
general (and thus, not charitable giving specifically), which also showed
evidence of both stable decisions and licensing (46).
The moral licensing effect in our data is especially interesting
with close examination of the formal definition of psychological li-
censing: “people’s perception that they are permitted to take an
action or express a thought without fear of discrediting themselves”
[(47), p.116]. This fear of discrediting oneself basically implies that
people want to uphold a positive MSI. MSI is strongly influenced
by past recollections of situations in which a person engaged in
(un)ethical behaviors (36). Our results seem to suggest that people
are able to uphold a positive MSI when making the choice to keep
the €2 now when they donated €0.50 the previous time.
Related to these licensing results, a recentmeta-analysis (24) suggested
that the effect size ofmoral licensing is relatively small and suggested that
statistical power be increased when studying moral licensing. Given the
large n in our data set, we had sufficient power to studymoral licensing in
the field. Moreover, the authors emphasized that researchers often stud-
ied the effect with two consecutive behaviors. We are able to study more
than two decisions per panel member to provide a full picture of the pat-
tern in donation decisions. In addition, althoughwe foundmore evidence
for stable patterns, we also found evidence for moral licensing.
Another interesting observation is our finding that most of the
decisions are to always keep themoney. This is not in line with research
on self-reported donations (26) or other prosocial behaviors (14–18),3 of 7










 suggesting that people are altruistic. In addition, 70 to 90% of U.S.
households donate to charity in a given year (www.philanthropyround-
table.org/), which would imply that they would be classified as Switcher
or even as Donator. Our observed low rate of Switchers (and Donators)
does not seem to align with these numbers. The first explanation might
be that there is a selection bias in our sample, with more selfish people
signing up to be panel members. However, the distribution of SVO
types in our sample matched previous studies among Dutch samples
(40). Moreover, we replicated previous findings on the effects of gen-
eral demographics on donations, giving our data strong external va-
lidity (4–6). All in all, we do not believe selection bias to be driving our
results. Still, an alternative possibility is that signing up leads to a busi-
ness mind-set among these participants—because they earn money
for filling in the survey—rather than an ethical or prosocial mind-
set [cf. studies of Tenbrunsel and Messick (48) and Tenbrunsel and
Northcraft (49)]. Although all participants might become less proso-
cial because of this, we still observe a distribution of proselfs and pro-
socials that is in line with the findings in the general Dutch population
(40). However, we cannot rule out this entry decision effect with our
data, but future research could study the potential differences inmind-
sets between people who signed up and those who did not.Leliveld and Risselada, Sci. Adv. 2017;3 : e1700077 20 September 2017Another explanation might be that the amounts of money at stake
are too small to have a meaningful psychological impact. However,
money has not only instrumental value but also psychological value
(50, 51). Moreover, research on moral licensing and consistency using
charity donations also used low amounts, varying from donations up
to $5 or $10 [for example, see the studies of Young et al. (16), Sachdeva
et al. (22), andMazar and Zhong (52)]. Therefore, we also believe that
the amounts are not too small. The final explanationmight be thatmost
previous studies on charitable giving used one-time-only decisions, hy-
pothetical decisions, and/or self-reportmeasures, whereas we report ob-
servations of longitudinal and actual donation decisions. This difference
might explain the high rate of Keepers, but we acknowledge that we do
not have empirical data to support this.
Studying longitudinal dynamics of donation decisions could provide
additional unique insights in future research. For example, we could
study the longitudinal aspects of the well-known default effect [cf. study
of Goswami and Urminksy (53)]. To date, the default effect—people’s
preference for the option that needs no response—has been mainly
shown on one-time-only decisions, that is, whether or not to be an or-
gan donor (54). By changing the setup within the panel research orga-
nization of how people make their changes, people will make multipleTable 2. Predictors of donation decisions within Switchers.Variable name Additional information variable Parameter estimates Interpretation of effectAge 0.005** The older, the more likely to donateGender Reference group, male −0.03 No effect of genderPolitical orientation Reference group, liberalConservative −0.16** Conservative voters less likely to
donate than liberal votersWon’t tell −0.13 Donation likelihood of won’t-tellers
not significantly different from liberal votersDonationt−1 Donated at t − 1 (0 = no; 1 = yes) 0.96*** When donated last time, one is
more likely to donate nowDonation first observation Donated at first observation
(0 = no; 1 = yes)0.79*** When donated first time in observation period,
one is more likely to donate nowCompNegDiff Tests effects of negative difference in number
of questions when not donated last time
(0 = equal number of questions;
1 = substantially less questions
at t than at t − 1)0.40*** When number of questions is substantially
lower now than last time, one is
more likely to donate than if the
number of questions is equalCompPosDiff Tests effects of positive difference in number
of questions when not donated last time
(0 = equal number of questions;
1 = substantially more questions
at t than at t − 1)0.12** When number of questions substantially
larger now than last time one is
more likely to donate than if number
of questions is equalDonationt−1* CompNegDiff Tests difference of effect CompNegDiff
when donated last time−0.48*** If donated last time, positive impact of
CompNegDiff gets “neutralized”
(0.40 + −0.48 = −0.08†)Donationt−1* CompPosDiff Tests difference of effect CompPosDiff
when donated last time−0.30*** If donated last time, positive impact of
CompPosDiff becomes negative
(0.12 + −0.30 = −0.18‡)Constant Constant −1.24***s2 Variance component of the randomized intercept 0.59*P < 0.05 **P < 0.01 ***P < 0.001 †This parameter estimate of −0.08 was not significant (P = 0.210). ‡This parameter estimate of −0.18 was
significant (P = 0.002).4 of 7
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nloaded fromchoices over time with the same default. Specifically, when we would
make the decision in a two-step procedure—first, people decide to keep
or to donate, and second, when deciding to donate, panel members can
choose which charity to donate to—one could study the longitudinal
effects of the default effect bymaking the “keep tomyself” or the “donate
to charity” the default.
Whenwe generalize our findings to implications for charities raising
money, our results suggest that charities should make different appeals
to nondonators and Donators. By changing the requested donation
amount, nondonatorsmight reconsider their decision and decide to do-
nate. People who already donated after a previous appeal should not
receive an appeal with a higher requested amount. This advice actually
goes against the foot-in-the-door technique (55), which suggests that
compliance with a small request increases the likelihood of complying
to a larger request later on. Our data suggest that this principle does not
hold for repeating donation appeals.
In summary, the present study was one of the first to investigate lon-
gitudinal patterns in people’s real (rather than self-reported) donation
decisions. The results reveal that most people choose not to donate to
charity. However, once they have donated previously, they decide to
keep the money more often the next time when there is more money






 MATERIALS AND METHODS
Data set
The original data set contained 308,704 observations. Note that we
followed the international review board guidelines in the entire project.
Each observation represents a survey started by a panel member. Here,
we are interested in a panel member’s donation decisions. Panel mem-
bers make the donation decision after completing a survey. Therefore,
we only used the data on completed surveys for our study (n = 296,651;
96.10%). We excluded the donations to Serious Request (n = 256),
which is a yearly fundraising event of a Dutch public national radio sta-
tion, because we are interested in understanding regular donation be-
havior to charities. Serious Request is a unique event that takes place in
December, and therefore, it is completely different from regular chari-
ties and may thus distort the donation behavior we are interested in.
Finally, given that we studied donation behavior, we needed at least
one question per survey to make sure that people made a decision in-
volvingmoney.We used the number of questions as a directmeasure of
the amount of payment: The number of questions of a survey determines
the payment a participant will receive. Three things are important in this
regard: (i) Participants will only be paid when completing the entire sur-
vey; (ii) the length of a survey is a random factor for participants because
they cannot choose themselves the surveys they are invited to participate
in; and (iii) participants cannot determine themselves howmuch theywill
earn by varying the effort they put in. Together, this indicates that the
number of questions is related only to the payment and not, for instance,
to the effort the participants decided to put in.
The resulting data set consisted of 282,232 donation decisions
made by 20,457 unique panel members in the period of March 2014
to January 2015. The second column in Table 1 shows the descriptives
of the full sample. The panel members have a mean age of 42.75 (SD,
15.60), and 64% is female. There are slightly more conservatives (38%)
than liberals (32%), and 44% of the sample has an income above the
national modal income.
We divided the panel members into three types on the basis of their
donation behavior over time. Keepers are defined as panelmembers whoLeliveld and Risselada, Sci. Adv. 2017;3 : e1700077 20 September 2017always keep themoney to themselves.Donators always donate themoney
to charity, and Switchers at least donated once but did not donate always.
Statistical analyses: Describing Keepers, Donators,
and Switchers
To investigate the differences between the three donation types, we used
several univariate tests. More specifically, we applied Pearson’s c2 tests
for the categorical variables andone-way analysis of variance (ANOVA)
tests followed by Tukey post hoc tests for the metric variables. We ap-
plied a multinomial logit model to simultaneously assess the relation-
ships between the donation type and multiple independent variables.
First, age is significantly different across the three types (F2,20454 =
4.17,P= 0.016). On the basis of the Tukey post hoc tests, we concluded
that Keepers are significantly older thanDonators (contrast, 1.26; con-
fidence interval, 0.22 to 2.31]). Second, the gender distribution differs
across the donation types [c2(2) = 41.77, P = 0.000]. Third, the distri-
bution of political orientation differs across the types [c2(4) = 48.27, P =
0.000]; the proportion of liberals seems the largest among the Switch-
ers. Finally, the distribution of income differs significantly across the
types [c2(12) = 88.55,P= 0.000]. The results suggest that the proportion
of the 2× modal income group is slightly larger for the Switchers than
for the other types.
We also tested the predictive value of the demographics on the clas-
sification of the type of decision-maker usingmultinomial logit models.
Results of these analyses are presented in tables S1 and S2 and reported
in the Results section.
SVO and greed as predictors of donation decisions
We randomly selected 1048 participants from the original pool of panel
members and had them complete the SVOmeasure (40). This measure
consisted of nine items, and each item consisted of three sets of out-
comes describing how many valuable points the participant and how
many another unknown person will get. Each item contained a
competitive (for example, 480 for self and 80 for another), an individu-
alist (for example, 540 for self and 280 for another), and a prosocial
choice (for example, 480 for self and 480 for another). When partici-
pants chose six of nine items, consistent with one of the orientations,
they were classified as that specific orientation. In the end, a total of
642 participants were classified as prosocial, 41 as competitive, and
261 as individualist (see table S3). Similar to other research on SVO
[for example, the study of Van Lange (40)], we combined individualist
and competitors into one group of proselfs.
SVOwas not related to the type of decision-maker [c2(2) = 0.61, P =
0.736]. To determinewhether these nonsignificant results support a null
hypothesis over a theory or whether the data are just insensitive, we
calculated the Bayes factor (56). The Bayes factor of a model assuming
dependence (between donation type and SVO type) compared to a
model assuming independence is 0.042, which is lower than 1/3 (that
is, sufficient evidence to conclude no dependence between donation
type and SVO type). Moreover, in an extended version of the multi-
nomial logitmodelwith donation decision-maker type as the dependent
variable (base category, Switchers), the SVO parameters did not signif-
icantly predict the decision-maker type (Donators, P = 0.957; Keepers,
P = 0.657). That is, Keepers, Donators, and Switchers could not be
described in terms of different SVO types.
We asked another randomly selected group of 1027 participants to
complete the seven-item greed scale (for example, “One can never
have enough money” and “I can’t imagine having too much things”;
Cronbach’s a = 0.88). However, Donators (M= 2.95; SD, 1.14; n = 40),5 of 7










 Switchers (M = 2.91; SD, 1.23; n = 46), and Keepers (M = 2.89; SD, 1.11;
n = 941) did not significantly differ on greed [F2,1024 = 0.06, P = 0.942
(Kruskall-Wallis, P = 0.978)]. Similar to the study on SVO, we
calculated the Bayes factor for a model based on dependence (between
donation type and greed) compared to a model assuming indepen-
dence. The Bayes factor was 0.051, which is smaller than 1/3; therefore,
there is sufficient evidence for the alternative model (that is, no effect
of the donation type on greed). Moreover, in an extended version of
the multinomial logit model with decision-maker type as the
dependent variable (base category, Switchers), the parameters of greed
were also not significant (Donators, P = 0.737; Keepers, P = 0.785).
That is, Keepers, Donators, and Switchers could not be described in
terms of different levels of greed.
Statistical analyses: Patterns in Switchers’
donation decisions
The model we proposed is a panel data probit model, because we ob-
servedmultiple binary decisions per panelmember (0, keeping to self; 1,
donating to charity). We accounted for potential state dependence by
including the donation decision in the previous period and for un-
observed heterogeneity by including a random intercept. Although
the data set is large (T > 3) (57), we included the first observed donation
decision to account for the initial conditions problem (58) and used the
Stata command gllamm to obtain the appropriate robust SE for this
model (59). On the basis of earlier work in this area (4–6, 43–45), we
included the demographic variables, age, gender, and political orienta-
tion. To study the interaction between the donation decision at the pre-
vious occasion and the difference between the number of questions in
the previous and the current survey, we created interaction variables.
We defined (the natural logarithm of) the number of questions to be
different if the difference was smaller than the 25th percentile (−1.098;
that is, substantially fewer questions) or larger than the 75th percentile
(1.098; substantially more questions) of the distribution. Results of the
analyses are in Table 2.
Recall of previous decision and amount
We checked whether people could accurately recall whether, and how
much, they donated the last time they entered the survey. To do so, we
collected additional data in July 2017. From the original sample, we
asked a randomly selected group of 916 participants to answer the
following questions: (i) “Please recall the last time you participated in
a survey from PanelWizard (so not this time). Please indicate whether
you decided to keep the money to yourself or to donate the money” (I
kept the money versus I donated the money); (ii) “Please indicate how
muchmoneywas at stake that last time? If you are not sure, pleasemake
an estimation” (answer could be typed in). In both questions, we ex-
cluded the “don’t know” option. Of all the 282,232 observations from
our original data set, the highest amount paid for a surveywas €3.40.We
excluded 141 observations from further analyses because they indicated
a higher amount than this natural cutoff value. We also excluded the
observations of nine participants who did not complete both questions.
The remaining number of participants was 766.
Of those 766 participants, 761 (99.34%) participants correctly re-
membered their decision to donate (yes or no). With respect to the
amount at stake, 252 (32.90%) participants correctly remembered the
exact amount. Moreover, 599 (78.20%) participants reported an
amount at stake within the range that we defined as “similar amount”
in the analyses (see Statistical analyses: Patterns in Switchers’ donation
decisions).Leliveld and Risselada, Sci. Adv. 2017;3 : e1700077 20 September 2017SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
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content/full/3/9/e1700077/DC1
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